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Abstract: The empirical literature about factors explaining local 
government delivery choices has traditionally focused the attention 
on the public or private production dilemma. However, hybrid 
organizational forms such as mixed public-private firms are 
increasingly used in several European countries. This paper makes 
use of survey data from Spanish municipalities to examine 
motivations of local governments for engaging in hybrid 
organizational forms. Data refer to two very relevant local services: 
water distribution and solid waste collection. The empirical analysis 
indicates that the use of mixed firms emerge as a type of 
pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and pure private 
production. Indeed, local governments make use of mixed firms 
when cost considerations (scale economies, transaction costs and so 
on), financial constraints and private interests exert contradictory 
pressures. On the contrary, political and ideological factors do not 
play any significant role on the local government decision of 
engaging or not in joint ventures with private partners.  
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Choosing hybrid organizations for local services delivery: An empirical 
analysis of partial privatization 
 




A large amount of research, theoretical as well as empirical, has been devoted 
to analyze why local governments choose to privatize public services or, 
instead, they retain public delivery [Bel and Fageda (2007) offer a recent and 
wide review of this literature]. Standard analysis has usually developed within a 
framework of public production versus privatization/contracting out choice. 
However, Warner and Hebdon (2001) emphasizes that privatization is not the 
unique available option in the menu for the reform of local services, and 
Hefetz and Warner (2007) argue that analysis must move beyond the either/or 
dichotomy of public versus private production and must pay more attention 
to the fact that local government contracting is a complex management 
process which combines transactions costs, managerial concerns, and 
democratic management issues. 
 
There is an increasing interest in analyzing reforms of delivery choices 
other than strict privatization and contracting out. In this way, Warner and 
Hefetz (2008) show significant growth in mixed delivery modes in the US 
since 1997. Mixed delivery in the US implies that a municipality is divided in 
several service districts, and pure public delivery is used in one or more 
districts whereas pure private production is used in the other district(s) within 
the same municipality.2 Another interesting work outside the ‘public or private 
decision’ is that by Tavares and Camões (2007). These authors study the 
reasons why Portuguese municipalities decide to reform bureaucratic delivery 
by creating municipal corporations, which are single function entities that 
have independent corporate status. Hence, even if delivery keeps being of 
pure public character with this reform, municipal corporations enjoy more 
discretion in employment and financial operations and have the right to own 
property. Because of this, they enjoy more flexibility in order to organize the 
delivery of the service.   
 
In this paper we take a different approach and, instead of focusing on pure 
delivery forms (be it public or private), we analyze the motivations that 
influence partial privatization of local services by means of using mixed 
public-private firms for delivery. Mixed public-private firms are hybrid 
2 Warner and Bel (2008) provide a detailed analysis of the organization of service delivery in the US.  
Research Institute of Applied Economics 2008                                               Working Papers 2008/03, 21 pages
3
organizational forms that escape the pure public/pure private dichotomy. In 
these firms ownership is divided between the government and the private 
sector, and they fully operate under private commercial law.  
 
Under partial privatization, municipal or supra-municipal governments 
engage in long term contracts with private firms through joint ventures. The 
government retains some degree of control in the firm, and day to day 
operations are usually conducted by the industrial private partner. This allows 
less costly monitoring, thus reducing transaction costs. Based on theoretical 
literature on partial privatization and on the relationship between partial 
private ownership and managers’ choices (e.g. Matsumura 1998; Matsumura 
and Kanda 2005), managers of mixed firms under effective control of local 
government are expected to give more weight to the objectives of local 
government and give less weight to profit maximization. In a similar fashion, 
Schmitz (2000) shows that partial privatization may imply an optimal 
combination of incentives for reducing costs and improving quality in 
comparison to pure production forms (either public or private).  
 
Mixed public-private firms have achieved a relevant role in the delivery of 
local services not only in Spain (Bel 2006, Warner and Bel 2008), but also in 
other European countries. Bognetti and Robotti (2007) explain the legal status 
of mixed firms in Italy3, discuss the pros and cons of mixed firms regarding 
efficiency and performance, and find that 14% of local public utilities in Italy 
are mixed public-private firms.4  
 
However, empirical literature on partial privatization of local services is 
extremely scarce. With this paper we intend to contribute to the literature by 
providing an empirical multivariate analysis of the factors that explain partial 
privatization: that is, the decision to choose mixed public-private firm to 
deliver the service, instead of choosing pure production forms -either public 
or private-. From our analysis we find that partial privatization appears to be 
more frequent when those factors leading to privatization (such as cost 
structure considerations, financial restrictions or private interests, among 
3 Bognetti and Robotti (2003) analyze the implications of the 2002 Financial Law in terms of the 
promotion of market mechanisms in local services delivery in Italy, including the use of different 
types of public-private mixed firms. 
4  I addition to this, Bognetti and Robotti (2007) pay attention too to public-public mixed 
enterprises in the sense that there are several owners and all of them are public entities. The mixed 
enterprises represent 13% of public utilities in Italy. This type of multigovernment firm is not 
common in Spain, and does not represent partial privatization. Hence, it is outside our main object 
of study. Multigovernment firms exist too in other countries, such as The Netherlands (Dijkgraaf 
and Gradus, 2008a, 2008b), or Norway (Sørensen, 2007); in these works they are usually considered 
as a type of public firms. 
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others) exert contradictory pressures. In this way, partial privatization seem to 
emerge as a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and 
pure private production choices. In addition to this, mixed public-private 
firms are positively related to intermunicipal cooperation, which suggests that 
taking advantage of scale economies can be another factor leading to partial 
privatization.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the 
theoretical background on the explanation of local governments’ choices 
concerning production form of local services, since this is the framework 
useful to analyze partial privatization. In section 3 we characterize the 
organization of the markets for solid waste and water distribution in Spain, 
since these provide the fields within which we conduct our empirical analysis. 
In section 4 we explain our empirical strategy, and in section 5 we discuss the 
results obtained from our estimations. Finally, we draw the main conclusions 
from our analysis. 
 
2. Factors explaning local governments’ delivery choices: Theoretical 
background 
 
Several theoretical approaches have been developed in relation to the choice 
of production form of local services. Public Choice was the first to 
comprehensively analyze delivery choices within the domain of public 
services, and according to this theory, overproduction and inefficiency will be 
the outcome when politicians and bureaucrats monopolize public services 
delivery (Niskanen, 1971). Two basic hypotheses that emerge from this 
approach are that contracting out by local governments improves technical 
efficiency in the production of the service, and provides lower costs in the 
service delivery.   
 
Costs considerations in the delivery choices of governments have been too 
the central issue in another group of theories related to privatization, which 
focuses on transaction costs. When deciding whether to make or buy a 
service, administrative costs and costs from incomplete contracts are 
important (Williamson 1979, 1999), and a core role is played by factors such 
as monitoring and control (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987). Following these 
theoretical approach a core hypothesis emerges: whenever transaction costs 
involved are huge, privatization will not likely deliver cost savings and 
improved performance. Hence, conditions like asset specificity or difficulty of 
performance monitoring are central in determining when a local service can 
be successfully privatized (Brown and Potoski, 2003), since they influence the 
level of transaction costs. 
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Property rights theory5 provides another important approach. The theory 
of incomplete contracts (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990) offers 
a useful analytical framework in situations where contracting is a complex 
operation. Hart, Shleifer & Vishny (1997) show that -with private production- 
the manager has incentives to reduce costs, but he/she has no concern for 
quality erosion. Hence, a trade-off between costs savings and service quality is 
likely to emerge. Privatization will likely reduce costs but it can also result in 
lower quality of service. In this theoretical setting, Schmitz (2000) shows that 
partial privatization may imply better incentives to reduce costs in comparison 
to pure public production while it may also imply better incentives to improve 
quality in comparison to pure private production.  
 
Based on these theoretical approaches, several hypotheses have been raised 
in the literature concerning the factors that influence local privatization. These 
hypotheses can be grouped into two economic and two political families (Bel 
and Fageda 2007). On the economic side, governments may be inspired by 
some combination of fiscal restrictions and anticipated lowered costs. 
Concerning fiscal motivations, two main restrictions on local finance have 
been working simultaneously since the 1980s. On one hand, local political 
environments have reduced the ability to raise revenues; on the other, supra-
local restrictions have limited transfers from other governments. Because of 
this, most studies of privatization include fiscal variables designed to measure 
the effects of such restrictions, the usual hypothesis being a positive relation 
between fiscal constraints and privatization.  
 
Still on the economic side, and now regarding cost considerations, 
emphasis has been put on the fact that contracting out works by introducing 
competition where there is a public monopoly (Savas, 1987), and by breaking 
the monopoly of public services contracting out should provide lower costs. 
A different approach emphasizes that costs saving from privatization can be 
achieved by exploiting economies of scale when the public service has been 
delivered over a suboptimal jurisdiction (Donahue, 1989).  
 
On the political side, policy makers can be moved by the desire to win the 
support of key interest groups, or by loyalty to an ideology. Within a 
democratic environment, two main motivations guide politicians in their 
decisions. On one side, politicians seek to win elections and control 
government. On the other side, according to their ideological attitudes 
politicians have preferences for some policies over others. This dual 
5 Based on seminal works by Alchian (1967) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). 
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dimension of politicians within a democratic environment has been named the 
citizen-candidate approach, following theoretical works by Osborne and Slivinski 
(1996), and Besley and Coate (1997). Within the domain of political interests, 
the decision to privatize is dependent on the existence of pressure groups 
(such as industrial interests or trade unions) having a particular interest in the 
rents resulting from a given form of service delivery. Ideology may also 
influence privatization: progressive parties have been linked to more pro-
public values (hence, more public production), whereas conservative parties 
are associated with more pro-private business orientation (hence, more 
privatization).  
 
All in all, the hypothesis more commonly analyzed in the literature 
examining the motivations of privatization of local services can be 
summarized as follows (Bel and Fageda 2007): a) Fiscal constraints should be 
positively associated with privatization. b) Private production can be 
encouraged by the desire of reducing costs, either through competition or by 
exploiting scale economies. c) The relative strength of different interest 
groups, such as unions or industrial business, should influence local 
government privatization decisions. d) Progressive governments will be more 
reluctant to privatize local services, while Conservative governments will be 
more prone to privatization. 
 
3. The organization of refuse collection and water distribution in Spain 
 
Spanish municipalities have a legal obligation to provide services for solid 
waste collection and for water distribution, as established in the Law 
781/1986 of Basis for the Local Regime. With regard to the effective delivery 
of these services, local governments are free to choose between different 
organizational forms available within the Spanish legal framework. In this way, 
there exists pure public and pure private production, as well as mixed forms 
or hybrid organizations (Warner and Bel, 2008).  
 
Pure public production implies that a public bureaucracy (a governmental 
department) or a public agency (a public unit working under public 
administrative law) produces the service in-house. In both cases, the 
bureaucracy or the public agency operates under the rules of public 
administrative law. Still within the framework of ‘public production’, a more 
sophisticated organizational form in Spain is that of public firms [as well as in 
some other European Union countries, such as Italy (Bognetti and Robotti, 
2007), Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2007, 2008b), Norway (Sørensen, 
2007), Portugal (Tavares and Camões 2007, or Sweeden (Ohlsson 2003)]. 
These are government owned firms that are managed and organized under 
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private commercial law rules. In this way, even if public firms are similar to 
public bureaucracy and public agencies in the sense that the government has 
ultimate control, with a public firm the managers enjoy much greater 
autonomy: they have much more flexibility with respect to inputs purchasing, 
work force organization, etc. Interestingly, public firms in Spain do not usually 
compete for contracts outside their own jurisdiction, contrarily to what 
happens in other European countries, such as The Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus, 2007) and  Norway (OECD 2000). 
 
On the other extreme along the public-private continuous there is the pure 
private production, which implies that a privately owned firm produces the 
service. A contract defines the relationship between the public administration 
and the private firm, and management and organization within the private 
firm are governed by rules of private commercial law.6 Because of this, private 
firms have much more flexibility than public bureaucracies concerning key 
issues in local services such as work force organization, managers’ 
remuneration, etc. 
 
Besides pure public production (including here public firm as a form of 
pure public, since it is under complete government control) and pure private 
production, a hybrid organizational form is relevant in Spain: mixed public-
private firms (mixed firms henceforth). Mixed firms are firms where 
ownership is divided between the government and the private sector, and 
operate under private commercial law. Under partial privatization, municipal 
or supra-municipal governments engage in long term contracts with private 
firms through joint ventures (Bel 2006, Warner and Bel 2008). Spanish mixed 
firms do not compete for contracts outside their own jurisdictions, contrarily 
to what happens in Italy (Bognetti and Robotti, 2007). 
 
In many cases the government retains a control stake in the firm, and the 
private partner tends to be a firm with a established position in the market for 
private delivery of local services. In such cases, however, day to day 
operations are usually conducted by the industrial private partner, whereas the 
government retains some degree of control over strategic decisions. In some 
cases, local governments hold a small fraction of shares in the mixed firm. 
Here the industrial private partner has more control over all decisions 
regarding the service, and the local government benefits from easier access to 
6 Most contracts to external suppliers are awarded through competitive tendering; but not all of 
them, since competitive tendering is not compulsory in Spain. As a matter of fact, only private 
firms participate in bids for contracts, and –as mentioned- public firms and mixed firms do not 
usually bid for contracts outside their own jurisdiction. Because of this, contracting out is –in 
practice- equivalent to private production in water distribution and, especially, in solid waste 
collection. 
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information on the service and on the firm. This allows less costly monitoring, 
thus reducing transaction costs.  
 
Data for the organization of the solid waste and water distribution services 
in Spain has been obtained by means of the II Survey on Production of Local 
Services, run by the research unit ‘Public Policies and Economic Regulation‘ at 
Universitat de Barcelona. Detailed information on the survey methodology 
and the data gathered from it is available in Bel (2006). 
 
With regard to solid waste collection, in 2003 56% of the municipalities 
with population over 2,000 had contracted out to private firms, which implies 
two/thirds of the Spanish population is being served by a private firm (see 
Table 1), since the average population of municipalities with private 
production is higher than that of the municipalities with public production. 
Public production (bureaucracy + public firm) exists in 37% of the 
municipalities, but only little more than one/fourth of population is served by 
public delivery. Finally, 7% of the municipalities (6% of the population) are 
served by mixed firms.  
 
Insert table 1 around here 
 
Concerning water distribution, 42% of the municipalities with population 
over 2,000 had contracted out solid waste collection to private firms in 2003, 
which implies 40% of the Spanish population is being served by a private 
firm, since the average population of municipalities with private production is 
close to the mean. Public production (bureaucracy + public firm) exists in 
more than 50% of the municipalities, but only 48% of population is served by 
public delivery. Finally, little more than 6% of the municipalities are served by 
mixed firms, but this represents 12% of population.7 
 
All in all, mixed firms have a small, but by no means negligible, share of 
service delivery in solid waste and water distribution. In the case of solid 
waste, mixed firms are particularly relevant among smaller municipalities, and 
the percentage of served population is slightly smaller than the share as a 
percentage of municipalities (7%). The opposite happens with water 
distribution: while the percentage of municipalities served by mixed firms is 
7  In our sample one municipality in solid waste collection (Parla) and 2 municipalities in water 
(Calvià and Marratxí) have public and private production coexisting within their jurisdiction. This 
represents 0.1% of municipalities and 0.2% of population served, for both services. Indeed, mixed 
public-private market delivery (in the U.S. sense, which means that public and private production 
coexists in the same jurisdiction) is only exceptional in Spain for solid waste and water distribution 
services. In fact, among European countries, Sweden is the only one in which it is relatively 
common to find this mixed market delivery (OECD 2000).  
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similar to that in solid waste collection, the percentage of population served is 
much larger (12%), since mixed firms (as well as public firms) in water 
distribution are particularly frequent in large municipalities (for instance, 16% 
of municipalities over 100,000 inhabitants are served by mixed firms).8 
 
To sum up, many municipalities in Spain take the decision of partially 
privatize delivery of solid waste and water distribution. In this way, they 
engage in joint ventures with private partners in order to organize the delivery 
of solid waste and water distribution. In doing so, they accept incurring in 
higher coordination costs as compared to pure public organizations. On the 
contrary, and compared to pure private production, these municipalities retain 
more control and information even if they give an important role to private 
partners, thus reducing transaction costs. When comparing to pure public 
production, they relinquish some control on the organization of the service, 
but they can enjoy whatever benefit that private partners can provide 
(managerial know how, scale economies, up-dated technology, incentives and 
so on.). In the next section we analyze what factors lead governments in Spain 
to partially privatize local services, thus choosing a hybrid organization instead 
of a pure organizational form (either public or private). 
.  
4. The Empirical Strategy 
 
The data used in the empirical analysis makes reference to municipalities 
larger than 2,000 inhabitants in Spain that filled out the survey mentioned 
above. It has been obtained information for 539 municipalities in solid waste 
collection and for 546 municipalities in water distribution.9  Note that the 
equation to estimate considers observations for both local services, so that 
each municipality of the sample may involve one or two observations. 
Information contained in the survey is for 2003 and includes the form of 
delivery (i.e. pure public production, pure private production, partially 
privatized) 10, the level (local or supralocal) at which the service is produced 
and, if applicable, the year when the service was contracted for the first time.  
8 Note that the percentages given in table 1 are adjusted for differences in 
municipalities size regarding the frequency of response to the survey. Hence, the adjusted 
percentage of mixed firms is very similar for water distribution and solid waste although the 
absolute number of municipalities differ between both services. This is due to the fact that mixed 
firms are relatively more frequent in large municipalities for water distribution.  
9 Recall that, initially, information on production form was obtained for 540 municipalities in solid 
waste and 548 in water distribution. However, Parla -in solid waste- and Calvià and Marratxí –in 
water distribution- have coexisting pure public and pure private production within their 
municipalities (that is to say, mixed delivery a la US). Hence, we have not been able to include these 
three observations in our empirical analysis.  
10 Our sample does not provide detailed information on the percentage of shares retained by the 
government in the case of mixed firms.  
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Data for population of municipalities in 2003 has been obtained from the 
Spanish Statistics Institute, while details about the local fiscal burden come 
from the Ministry of Treasury.11 The web site of the Spanish Ministry of 
Domestic Affairs provides information for electoral results at the city/town 
level. Finally, data concerning the strength of industrial interests is available in 
the 2004 Spanish Economic Yearbook published by La Caixa, a Spanish 
savings bank.  
 
The empirical model has to do with the literature on factors explaining 
local government’s delivery choices. According to the theoretical framework 
stated in section 2, our empirical model includes several variables that capture 
economic aspects; the demand of local services at the municipal level, fiscal 
stress industrial interests and transaction costs. Additionally, the model 
includes variables that account for political and ideological factors. The 
equation to estimate takes the following form:  
 
Yi =  + 1popi + 2pop2i + 3coopi + 4transaction_costs + 5fiscal_burdeni + 
       + 6industrial_interestsi + 7(political and ideological factors)i + i                                   (1) 
 
where Yi is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when a mixed firm 
produces the service and 0 when a pure organizational form (either public or 
private) is in charge of the delivery of the service 
 
We include the following explanatory variables in equation (1). Variables 
for population and the square of population of municipalities are considered, 
pop and pop2. Population is usually used as a proxy for the demand of local 
services. We expect the relationship between the demand size and the decision 
to partially privatize to have an inverse-U shape (Bel & Miralles, 2003). 
Dealing with private partners, small towns bear high transaction costs while 
large cities do not take benefit from scale economies or better managerial 
capacities, since large cities already operate at the optimal scale and enjoy 
highly skilled managerial capabilities. 
 
Furthermore, we include a dummy variable that account for the use of 
intermunicipal cooperation to deliver the service, coop. This variable takes 
value of 1 when the service is produced at the supramunicipal level, while it is 
0 when production is municipal. Municipalities that cooperate may take 
several benefits from engaging in joint ventures with private partners (scale 
11 Data for this variable refer to 2002 since it is the fiscal burden a year prior to a decision that 
should influence local government choices. 
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economies, managerial capacities and so on) and, in turn, they may afford low 
transaction costs and a favorable position in the bargaining process.12  
 
Recall that the decision of using mixed firms may imply higher transaction 
costs in comparison to pure public production but lower transaction costs in 
comparison to pure private production. Keeping this in mind, each service is 
associated with different amounts of transaction costs depending on the 
characteristics of the production process (asset specificity, ease of 
performance measurement). To this regard, we measure the role of 
transaction costs through a dummy variable for the considered service, 
transaction_costs. This variable takes a value of 1 when the service is water 
distribution and 0 for solid waste collection. The transaction costs of 
contracting out should be higher for water distribution than for solid waste 
since the former service has strong network features. Building indicators 
ranging from 1 (low specificity, or easy measurement) and 5 (high specificity, 
and difficult measurement), Brown and Potoski (2005) find asset specificity of 
3.94 and ease of measurement 2.44 for water distribution. Otherwise, they 
find that asset specificity is 3.00 and ease of measurement 2.06 for residential 
solid waste and 3.06 and 1.97 for commercial waste. In the same fashion, Bel 
(2006) provides evidence that contract terms are longer in water than in solid 
waste.  
 
Equation (1) also includes fiscal burden as a explanatory variable, 
fiscal_burden. According to legal specifications in the Spanish budgetary 
process, we construct this variable as the sum of the financial expenditures 
(chapters 3 –interests- and 9 –amortization- of the expenditures budget) over 
the sum of ordinary revenues of the local government (chapters 1 through 5 
of the revenues budget).13 As we mentioned above, it is more likely some 
form of private production in delivering services when local governments face 
fiscal constraints. The use of private production may imply either contracting 
out to private firms or engaging in joint ventures with private partners 
 
We also take into account the influence of industrial interests on 
privatization, industrial_interests. This variable reflects industrial activity by 
measuring the dimension of industrial activity in the city relative to the whole 
12 It is worthwhile noting that intermunicipal cooperation in Spain –as well as in other European 
countries- is compatible with any organizational form (Bel and Fageda, 2007). On the contrary, 
intermunicipal cooperation as it is understood in the US (e.g. Warner and Hefetz, 2002a, 2002b, 
Levin and Tadelis, 2007) is usually not compatible with private production. In the Netherlands too, 
intermunicipal cooperation is not compatible with private production (Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2007, 
2008).
13 Data on fiscal burden are not available for nine municipalities so that 18 observations have been 
excluded from the sample. Data for other nine municipalities are available only for 2001. 
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country level. It is based on an index that measures the tax revenues share of 
the city over the whole country. Here tax revenues refer to local taxes for 
industrial activities. The expected sign of the coefficient for this variable is not 
clear. The higher the strength of industrial interests is the higher the pressures 
are for fully privatize the delivery of the service. Hence, the use of pure 
private (public) production is more (less) likely when the strength of industrial 
interests increases but it is ambiguous the effect on the use of mixed firms.  
 
The effects of political and ideological influences are captured by using 
two distinct variables. Indeed, we first consider the political affiliation of the 
mayor, mayor. We construct this variable as a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 when the mayor belongs to a conservative party and 0 when the 
mayor belongs to a progressive party.14 Second, we consider the ideological 
position of the constituency in national elections, ideology. We construct this 
variable by measuring the mean percentage of votes obtained by conservative 
parties in the national elections of 2000 and 2004. In our view, the ideology of 
the constituency is reflected in its stance in national elections. This is so 
especially if we remember that Spain has a parliamentary system, and the 
prime minister is elected by the Parliament. Hence, national elections are the 
most ideologically motivated elections in Spain.  
 
Note that the political affiliation of the mayor may differ from the ideology 
the constituency shows in national elections. In fact, a mayor’s affiliation 
might also depend on the relative strength of interest groups (industrial 
unions, trade unions, and coalitions at the local level, etc). In this regard, it is 
worth noting that the correlation between the variables mayor and ideology is 
0.53. This indicates that we should not consider these two variables jointly 
since multicollineality may prevent identifying each individual effect. 
However, these variables may be capturing different aspects of the decision 




Table 2 shows the results of the estimates of the two specifications of 
equation (1) for both considered services. The equation is significant at 1% 
level, and the pseudo-R2 is in within the usual range in the empirical literature 
on local privatization. We find that all variables capturing economic factors 
are statistically significant while political and ideological factors do not play 
14 We exclude from this estimation those municipalities whose mayors do not belong to a standard 
political party (parliamentary representation either at national or regional -state- level), since we 
cannot precisely infer where such mayors lie on the conservative/progressive continuum 
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any significant role. Thus, we find clear evidence that the use of mixed firms 
by local governments is based on a very pragmatic approach.  
 
Insert table 2 about here 
 
Coefficients (sign as well as statistical significance) suggest that 
governments seem to be more prone to engage in hybrid organizational forms 
(such as mixed firms) when transaction costs of the service are high (+ sign, 
which should prevent privatization), when financial burden of the local 
government is high (+ sign, which should promote privatization), and when 
local industrial interests are weaker (- sign, which should prevent 
privatization). Hence, mixed firms appear to be more frequent when cost 
considerations, financial restrictions and private interests exert contradictory 
pressures.  
 
Indeed, high transaction costs and weak industrial interests prevent the 
choice of pure private production. On the contrary, financial constraints 
prevent the choice of pure public production. Mixed firms seem to emerge as 
a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between pure public and pure private 
production.  
 
The sign of the coefficients (and its statistically significance) of variables 
for population show the expected inverse-U shape relationship between 
municipalities size and the decision to partially privatize the service delivery. 
Hence, medium-sized municipalites seem to use more commonly mixed firms. 
Concerning these municipalities, the using of mixed firms allows them to 
obtain more benefits than the associated transaction costs of dealing with 
private partners.   
 
Besides, mixed firms are positively related to intermunicipal cooperation. 
Engaging in a public-private partnership with an industrial partner requires 
bargaining power on the government side. Large cities engage with private 
partners in mixed firms by themselves. On the other hand, a joint powers 
authority set up for intermunicipal cooperation increases the bargaining power 
of small municipalities. Hence, mixed firms are more frequent among small 
municipalities engaged in cooperation than among small municipalities that do 
not cooperate. In this regard, the mean population of municipalities that use 
mixed firms is much lower when the service delivery is undertaken at the 
supramunicipal level, as table 3 shows. 
 
Insert table 3 around here 
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Table 4 and 5 show the results of the estimates for water distribution and 
solid waste collection, respectively. Concerning water distribution, the using of 
mixed firms seems to be more likely when financial burden is high and also 
when industrial interests are weaker. Additionally, municipalities that 
cooperate use more often mixed firms to deliver the service. It is also found 
some evidence of the inverse-U shape relationship between municipalities size 
and partial privatization. Again ideological and political factors do not play a 
relevant role in the decision of using or not mixed firms. Results of the 
estimation for solid waste collection indicate that intermunicipal cooperation 
is strongly positively correlated with the using of mixed firms. In fact, this is 
the main factor that explains local government’s choices of pure or hybrid 
organizational forms in solid waste. The influence of the rest of explanatory 
variables is not clear for this service. 
 
Note that the cost structure of both local services is quite different. In 
water distribution, the network characteristic of the service infrastructure is 
associated with a large amount of sunk investments. This implies high 
transaction costs and gives relevance to density economies derived from 
population concentration. For water distribution, the complexity of the 
production process implies that all the variables capturing economic aspects 
will influence on the decision of using or not mixed firms. Indeed, the 
organizational form chosen by local governments in water distribution seem 
to follow a very pragmatic pattern but several factors condition such pattern 
 
On the contrary, transaction costs and density economies do not play a 
relevant role in the delivery of solid waste collection, which has a simpler 
production process. However, some fixed costs are required to deliver this 
service so that scale economies derived from the amount of output produced 
are present. Hence, very small towns may cooperate with other municipalities 
in the delivery of solid waste to take advantage of such scale economies. With 
cooperation, those small towns may benefit from a stronger bargaining power 
when dealing with private partners as well. From our results, the pragmatic 
approach that local governments also follow in the organizational form 
choices for solid waste is mainly influenced by the previous decision of 
cooperate or not with other municipalities. Neither the relative strength of 
industrial interests nor fiscal burden of municipalities seems to be very 
influential.  
 
Insert table 4 about here 
 
Insert table 5 about here 
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The increasing relevance of mixed firms in Spain –as well as other 
European countries- could help explain why public services delivery reform is 
more stable in Europe than in the US (Warner and Bel, 2008), where 
oscillation between public delivery and private delivery is much more frequent 
(Hefetz and Warner, 2004, 2007). It may well happen that mixed firms 
increase the flexibility of organizational forms available for local governments 
seeking to implement a reform. On the one hand, governments that want to 
escape from pure public production but do not want (or cannot) go to pure 
private production can use mixed firms. On the other, local governments that 
have experienced a private contract failure might use mixed firms if they do 
not want to go back to pure public production.  
 
 
 6. Concluding remarks 
 
The using of mixed public-private firms has a relevant and increasing role 
in several European countries. However, empirical literature about factors 
explaining local government delivery choices has focused the attention on the 
public or private production dilemma. In analyzing such dilemma, different 
theories provide empirical tests to account for cost considerations, fiscal 
constraints and political and ideological factors.  
 
This paper adds to previous empirical literature by examining attributes of 
municipalities that influence the decision of local governments to engage in 
hybrid organizational forms (such as mixed firms) rather than using pure 
production forms (either public or private). Additionally, it takes into account 
the role that intermunicipal cooperation and transaction costs may have on 
that decision.   
 
The data used comes from a survey for municipalities concerning two 
relevant local services; solid waste and water distribution. From this survey, 
we know that both services are delivered by mixed firms in a significant 
proportion of municipalities. In Spain, the using of mixed firms can be 
considered a partial privatization where municipal or supra-municipal 
governments engage in long term contracts with private firms through joint 
ventures. Under this hybrid organizational form, local governments take 
advantage of private partners from the exploitation of scale economies, the 
using of better managerial capacities, incentives and so on. And, in turn, they 
may afford lower transaction costs than in the case they contract out to a 
private firm.   
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Results from the empirical analysis show that the use of mixed firms by 
local governments is based on a very pragmatic approach. Indeed, mixed 
firms seem to emerge as a type of pragmatically based ‘third way’ between 
pure public and pure private production.  
 
We find an inverse-U shape relationship between municipalities size and 
the decision to partially privatize the service. Furthermore, municipalities that 
cooperate use more commonly mixed firms. This latter result is particularly 
relevant for solid waste collection. Both the size of the municipality and the 
decision of cooperate or not have influence on the possible exploitation of 
scale economies and the amount of transaction costs that the local 
government affords. Hence, these cost considerations condition the choice of 
using or not hybrid organizational forms.  
 
In the same direction, we obtain evidence that local governments are more 
prone to use mixed firms when the specific transaction costs of the service are 
high, and when industrial interests are weaker. Those costs and weak local 
interests should prevent the choice of pure private production. In addition to 
this, the use of mixed firms is more likely when fiscal burden of local 
governments is high. Financial constraints prevent the choice of pure public 
production.  
 
Hence, local governments make use of mixed firms when cost 
considerations, financial restrictions and private interests exert contradictory 
pressures. On the contrary, political and ideological factors do not have any 
influence on the local government decision of using or not mixed firms. 
  
Through our research several  interesting questions have arisen, such as 
whether mixed firms replace  mostly pure public or  pure private production 
(if there is any significant difference between these two potential origins). In 
the same way, knowing the detailed percentage of government ownership in 
mixed firms would likely provide interesting additional insights. Obtaining the 
information on these issues and, therefore, being able to better analyze the 
dynamics of partial privatization is in our agenda for future research. 
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Table 1 Solid Waste Collection and Water Distribution (percentage of concessions 
and percentage of population), Spain 2003 








 Percentage of municipalities 
Solid Waste Collection (adjusted total) 24.2 12.4 56.3 7.0 
Water Distribution (adjusted total) 27.7 23.9 41.8 6.4 
 Percentage of population served 
Solid Waste Collection (adjusted total) 14.8 12.4 67.0 5.6 
Water Distribution (adjusted total) 13.8 34.1 40.2 11.7 
Notes:  Municipalities over 2,000 population.   
n=540 (for solid waste collection), and n=548 (for water distribution). 
Percentages do not add up to 100% because one municipality in solid waste collection and 
two municipalities in water have public and private production coexisting in the same jurisdiction. 
This represents 0.1% of municipalities and 0.2% of population served, for both services. 




Table 2. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining the use of mixed firms 
(logit) 
 Specification (1)  Specification (2)  
Pop 5.31e-06 (1.42e-06)*** 5.56e-06 (1.42e-06)*** 
Pop2 -2.04e-12 (5.31e-13)*** -2.09e-12 (5.17e-13)*** 
Coop 1.27 (0.25)*** 1.26 (0.25)*** 
transaction_costs 0.66 (0.26)** 0.69 (0.25)*** 
Fiscal_burden 2.99 (1.23)** 3.06 (1.20)** 
industrial_interests -153.57 (77.87)** -126.75 (65.23)** 
Intercept -3.73 (0.34)*** -4.21 (0.63)*** 
Mayor 0.39 (0.26) - 
Ideology - 1.12 (1.06) 
N 
Pseudo R2 










Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
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Table 3. Distribution of population for municipalities that use mixed firms 

















20 28  16 9  
Population 
(Average) 




18,006.99 166,578.5  15,315.46 191,857.5  
Note 1: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
 
Table 4. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining the use of mixed firms 
for water distribution (logit) 
 Specification (1)  Specification (2)  
Pop 5.77e-06 (3.14e-06)* 5.87e-06 (2.22e-06)*** 
pop2 -2.75e-12 (5.11e-12) -2.55e-12 (2.96e-12) 
Coop 0.97 (0.34)*** 0.94 (0.32)*** 
fiscal_burden 3.39 (1.51)** 3.47 (1.47)** 
industrial_interests -216.07 (113.01)** -185.01 (97.77)** 
Intercept -2.90 (0.35)*** -3.92 (0.81)*** 
Mayor 0.45 (0.33) - 
Ideology - 2.31 (1.44) 
N 
Pseudo R2 










Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
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Table 5. Estimates of the equation of factors explaining the use of mixed firms 
for solid waste collection (logit) 
 Specification (1) Specification (2) 
Pop 2.99e-06 (5.23e-06) 3.70e-06 (5.47e-06) 
pop2 3.13e-12 (8.43e-12) 2.19e-12 (8.81e-12) 
Coop 1.75 (0.46)*** 1.77 (0.45)*** 
fiscal_burden 2.69 (2.19) 2.85 (1.98) 
industrial_interests -88.29 (83.79) -67.80 (66.24) 
Intercept -4.01 (0.61)*** -3.69 (0.90)*** 
Mayor 0.31 (0.42) - 
Ideology - -0.70 (1.53) 
N 
Pseudo R2 











Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroskedasticity) 
Note 2: Significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) 
